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CHAPTER ONE 
THE PROSPECT FOR A* 




I N 191 9, after the steel trust, by the use of troop6 . ,gunmen, scabs, lying newspapers and mass starva- - tion, had violently broken the strike of 365,000 
steel workers and lashed these oppressed toilers back 
' 
into the mills, I ventured to forecast in my book, The 
Greag Steel Strike Ivnd Its Lessons, that "it will, not be 
- long until they have another big movement under way. 
. . . The great steel strike of 19 19 will seem only a pre- 
liminary skirmish when compared with the tremendous 
battles that are bound to come." 
This forecast is now in all probability about to be re- 
alized. Events are fast shaping up for the greatest 
labor struggIe in American history, one that will in- 
volve unparalleled masses of striking workers, and 
probably several industries, in the very heart of the 
. industrial system, with the steel industry as the storm 
center of the whole movement. Already the beginnings 
of this huge struggle are to be seen, as I write this, in 
, the upheavals among the automobile workers. 
The Long Struggle of the Steel Workers 
Ever since the decisive defeat of trade unionism in 
the steel industry during the great Homestead strike 
44 years ago, the steel trust has ruthlessly lorded it 
3 
- over the vast army of steel slaves. The steel 
have enfomed upon the workers the most ruthless ex- 
loitation, with low wages, the long day and 
ek, infamous spy -systems, boss tyranny in the 
lesale slaughter by unprotected machinery, etc., etc 
y have made of the steel towns dirty, miserable 
poverty-stricken, disease-laden shack communities rule 
by gunmen and servile company political tools and 
devoid of all culture and beauty. And the national and 
state governments have actively assisted in maintaining 
this outrageous situation. 
The steel workers have waged many fierce and de- 
termined struggles to end their intolerable position: the 
heroic Homestead strike of the Amalgamated Associa- 
tion of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers (A.A.) in 1 892, 
the hard-fought battles of the A.A. in 190 1 and 1909, 
the brave struggles of the I.W.W. in McKees Rocks in 
1 909, the huge national strike of the 24 allied A. F. of L. 
unions in 19 19, the bitter strike of the Steel and Metal 
Workers Industrial Union (T.U.U.L.) in ~ m b r i d ~ e  
in 1933, the general organization campaign of the A.A 
in 1934 and many other big movements throughout 
the years. During these heroic struggles for liberty, 
company thugs have jailed and murdered many steel 
workers and union organizers, and their martyrdom is 
symbolized by the asassination of the able and coura- 
geous organizer, Fanny Sellins, who was shot to death 
by steel trust gunmen in 1 9 1 9. 
All these courageous battles of the steel workers were 
lost, that is, lost in the sense that they failed to achieve 
their major goal of unionizing the &dustry. Some of 
them, it is true, brought a measure of relief ta .the steel 
workers, such as the great 1919 strike which iholihed 
the 12-hour day and seven-day week and ~ ~ i e d  
generally improved conditions. All of them the 
iron of class bitterness deep into the steel wo-' 
hearts, but gone of them resulte'd-in establishing a sdtlid 
organization in the steel industry. --I\ 
The ever-present enemy combination of the power- 
ful steel trust and the hostile capitalist government, 
aided by the maneuvers of dishonest A. F. of L. labor 
leaders, was always too much for the steel workers. But 
now the steel workers, with better leadership and or- 
ganization, are mobilizing their forces for a new strug- 
gle, for a fresh attempt to secure relief from the out- 
rageous tyranny and exploitation in their industry. The 
Committee for Industrial Organization, comprising 15 
unions with a total of some 1,500,000 members and 
headed by John L. Lewis, the aggressive president of 
the United Mine Workers of America, is going ahead 
with determination to organize the half million workers 
in the great steel industry. The field leader of the work 
is Phillip Murray, chief of the Sfeel Workers Organiz- 
ing Committee (S.W.O.C.) and vice-president of the 
U.M.W.A. 
A Favorable Outlook 
Many factors combine to make the present sirnation 
very favorable for the success of the C.I.O. campaign. 
First, the steel workers, like the great body of Ameri- 
can workers generally, are in a highly militant mood 
and are determined to force concessions from their em-, 
ployers. They are especially strengthened in their new 
- u 
,++ - - i 
9 
A ,  
2 ,- 
: t  morale by the defeat of Landon in the 1936 elections, 
-7. 
and they feel a new.sense of confidence and power. 
' Second, conditions in the industry are on the up- 
'-grade from an economic standpoint and are favorable 
9 for a drive. to organization. Besides, the steel bosses ate somewhat on the dkfensive after their big election 
defeat. 
/ 
.' ;J Third, the Roosevelt government is deeply obligated 
' to labor and even if it will take no active steps to organ- 
ize the steel workers, it will probably not definitely op- 
pose it, as so many adminiitrations have strenuously 
done in the past. 
Fourth, another favorable factor is that for the first 
time a substantial section of organized labor, the C.I.O., 
realizes the vital importance of organizing steel and is 
pushing forward energetically toward its accomplish- 
ment. The drive also has the support of the Communist 
Party, and other militant and progressive forces. 
Fifth, the organization drive is proceeding on the ad- 
vantageous basis of uniting all the steel workers into one 
industrial union, the A.A., instead of into a couple of 
dozen disunited, squabbling craft unions as in previous 
campaigns. 
A Huge Stdm in the Making 
The drive of the steel workers for trade union organi- 
zation will almost certainly result in a big strike, prob- 
ably the greatest this country has' ever known. I t  goes 
without saying that the steel workers will do every- 
thing possible to secure their demands without such 
a struggle; for they well know the toll of suffering that 
that they have to pay in all great strikes. But they 
6 
probably wifl have no choice in the matter, =,the arro- 
gant steel kings will most surely force a s 
will never concede the workers' elemen 
for the right to organize, better wages, 
improved working and living conditions 
mak;.ng every form of resistance they 
given circumstances. They made this 
very outset of the steel organizing mxnpaign * in the Id. 'i 
-<I  . 
middle of 1936, when the American Iron and Steel In- 
' .n3L 
stitute, the central organization of the steel magnates, . b, 
declared. in a statement published simultaneously in 
375 national full-page newspaper advertisements at a 
cost of $500,000 that the steel corporations were deter- 
mined to resist at all costs the organization of the steel 
industry. The militancy of the automobile kings and 
coal barons; closely allied with the steel magnates, also 
illustrates the employers' determination to fight to save 
the open shop. 
Nor can the Rooavelt government be counted upon 
to prevent the strike ,by forcing the steel trust to estab-. 
lish human standards in their industry. What is devel- 
oping is a head-on cullision between the steel trust and 
their long-oppressed workers. Unless all signs fail, the 
great steel strike of 1 9 1 9 was only a dress-rehearsal for 
the big battle that is looming up in 1 93 7. 
The' Vital Issuea at Stake 
\ 
The successful outcome of the present organization 
caknpagn in the steel industry will have wide economic, 
political and social repercussions. I t  will far outrun in 
significance the building up of the Amalgamated As- 
7 
ftd union of? 500,OO 0 WW~&S+. iPn- 
objective may be. It w3J konstitute 
whole working dastover the ape9 
.American finance capital and it will deal.- 
blow to company unionism in 811 industries. 
gme an enormous stimulus to trade union orgiini- 
n, both iri the mass production industries and 
hout industry generally. In 1919 already we 
ood that a victory of the great steel strike wodd 
;: open the doors far organization in many industr~g but ' 
now the unidnizing. possibilities of such a victory ' are 
far greater. It %would prepare the way for the orgkni- 
zation of many dllions of workers and (would institute 
a rdical irnpcoizement-,in wages and working conditions 
throughout Am&an ind-. 
Victory .in steel- would also have profound , affects 
upon the trade mion movement as a whole. It wodd' 
definitely establish the principle of industrial unionism; 
not only in the mass pGd~ction industries, but aid also 
$hk reorganization of dl trade unionsfupon an induitrial 
b i b :  It. would lay the basis for a new and progressive 
teadesship in the A. F. of L. and would underminerthe 
pa-dYzin~. policies, and conupt regime o f .  the-ptesent 
' clique of reactionaries who have long been a stumbling 
block to the American working class, A swcafd b u i  
come of the steel drive would so strengthen the hands 
of the progressive elements' i n  the trade unions that 
they would be able -to w r y  through .the rcunificitdon 
~f the A* F9 ~f L. in -spite of the policy d, the Greens, 
Wolls, - Hutchesons, Freysi, Whartoris md  other W r  





The success of the steel campaign wodd a h  great- 
ly push labor forward politically. Not only would the "'kf 4 
broad mass movement 'that must develop wOmd the *) 
organization of steel result in making the 3&bow 
week, adequate unemployment relief, genuine m i d  
security, abolition of industrial spy systems, e l imk-  
tion of strikebreaking detective agencies, and mmy . 
other demands of the workers, active political issues- 
that would have to be granted by the employers and the 
government, but it would also further the political or- 
ganization of the workers. The workeri' class conscious- 
ness would be aroused, and volume and speed would be 
given to the movement for a Farmer-Labor Party and 
the eventual development of the People's Front in the 
United States. Nor could such popular advances in the 
United States fail to have favorable effects upon the 
world struggle of the toiling masses in defense of de- 
mocracy and against hunger, fascism and war. 
On the other hand, a defeat for the workers in the 
present effort to organize the steel industry would be 
a most serious setback to labor generally. The after- 
effects of the 19 19 steel strike defeat were disastrous 
for organized labor as a whole, and a defeat of the steel 
workers now would be a worse blow and would give a 
great stimulus to reaction and fascism in the United 
States. Such a defeat must be avoided at all costs. Vic- 
tory for the steel workers must and can be achieved if 
the struggle is carried through aggressively and with 
the systematic mobilization of all of labor's available 
forces. 
The bosses know full well the possibilities and im- 
pliations of & ~5tgwk .mi~n victory in steel. That is why 
to fight'militmtlY and to bring in- 
cry of forces' against it. The G k n s  
reactionaries of the, A. F. of L. also know what 
their antiquated system of craft unionism and 
ureaucratic jobs, and that is why they, too, 
ghting against the success of the steel campaign, 
going to the extent of splitting the i a b r  move- 
C.LO. unions, in order to prevent 
. . 
when' the big. steel .strike comes, its wLning must 
oe made the first order of business for every progressive 
force + the United States, A great steel strike would 
be a turning poidt not only in the trade union move- 
ment, but in American life generally. The fight of the 
steel workers for organization is the cutting edge of the 
struggle of the tailing masses against the whole lineup 
of reaction and incipient fascism in the United States: 
CHAPTER TWO 
STEEL STRIKE STRATEGY 
w HEN organized labor goes into such an ?a- portant strike struggle as that evidently n k ,  looming in connection with the organiiation . 
of the steel industry it must proceed with a definite ,. 
strike strategy, based upon a realistic measuring of the 
balance of the opposing class forces and modified from 
time to time as changing circumstances dictate. We may 
be sure that the employers, in their fight to preserve the 
open shop, which is worth billions to'them in extra prof- 
its, are going ahead with a highly developed strategy. 
In the following pages, therefore, I shall undertake 
to outline some of the major principles of a sound strat- 
egy- and tactics for the steel workersJ struggle; to de- 
velop a line of policy that is realistic and justified by the 
present economic and political situation and by the gen- 
eral relation of forces between the capitalists and the 
workers. The leaders of the C.I.O. and the Steel Work- 
ers Organizing Committee are, of course, experienced 
strike leaders, and it is not for me to instruct them in 
strike strategy. There remains, however, the task of 
putting into popular form the principles of strike strat- 
egy and strike organization in this very vital situation. 
In the development of any severe strike struggle be- 
tween the workers and their employers the following 
general propositions, among others, should be constant- 
ly borne .in mind. 
First, the cultivation df a firm ideological solidarity 
11 
in the m p h  of the strikers. Tbe- born proceding from 
the t m & t i d  qloiters'*pr'$@pJtl of divide and con- 
nstantlj. attempt to s$it thk workers along k 
kd and unskilled, Aperiam~ and foreign-born, 
and whites, men and 'women, employed and 
oyed, adults and youth, Catholic and Protes- 
cals and conservatives. This danger is esped- 
very acute in . . i~&hs -. in the boss-rid&n steel in- 
In 1919, the e&$&irs . ! .  and their tools tried with all 
r; these mans to pit one section of the workers against-the 
other and they m;ey be dipended upon to do so again in 
1 93 7. As against,: tkese disruptive moves the workers, 
leaders must caqm@r .by a loyal defense in the interests 
- of all these various groups, thus making them all feel 
that they have eyevthing to gain from the success'of 
. the general movkment. 
They must focus the attention of the masses p r i e -  
ly upon the immediate economic and political demands 
of the steel workers and reject all reactionary efforts to 
divert. the woqlqris' attention into abstract discussions of 
race, religion, politics, etc. Especially there must be no 
boss-inspired ~ed-$siting allowed to take root in the 
steel workers' movement and. to disrupt its forces. The 
steei campaign can be a success only if the maximum 
possible ideological solidarity of the workers is achieved . . .  : . 
and mantained. + 
. Second, another important consideration in the, ques- 
tion of developing a' successful 'strike strategy is the care- 
fbl 'cultivation of a high' morale among -the strikers. d 
' 
This'is very necessary in fighting suck a vicious cdmbi- 
nation as the steel trust, and morale buiIding m F t  be 
. . 
gone about systematically. The achievement of the ide 
ological solidarity previously discussed is an importan 
element in developing a good morale among thi work 
ers, but it must be supplemented by various other fit 
tors, including persistent education of the -*; re- 
garding. the strike situation and the politid meadpg 
of the struggle, by cultivating mass participation $n 
"in : - 
strike activities and democratic control of the strike, by 
exercising a determined and reliable leademhip, by a 
firm but not mechanical discipline, an effective drama- 5 
tization of the struggle, good strike organization, etc. 
Third, a W e r  elementary question of good strike 
strategy is to proceed upon the general principle of the 
offensive. Workers, like soldiers, fight best on the at- 
tack. A defensive strike is a losing strike. The steel 
workers should never allow themselves to be put on the 
deknsive. Every halt must be utilized to organize 
a new attack and every attack by the employers or the 
government must be offset by some form of renewed 
counter offensive. Only when workers are completely 
defeated is such a policy not possible. The steel workers 
must know how to guard their strike reserves and to 
draw upon them whe' a new forward movement is nec- 
essary. The present economic and political situation 
greatly favors a policy of the offensive. 
m These elements of strike strategy- firm ideological solidarity of the workers, a high morale in the strike, 
a strike that proceeds upon the principle of the offen- 
sive-must be constantly borne in mind in developing 
every stage of the comingostruggle. But there are many 
other principles of strike strategy, no less important, 
which I shall now proceed to discuss in some detail. 
The United Front 
A us&$ & m a n d )  is a fundamental principle of 
,$& a11 strikes, as well as military operations. 
~nvolved in it is the unified action of the fight- 
ces. Failure to achieve such a unified strike leader- . : 
rincipally through craft divisions, has cost the 
ers many a bitter defeat. Especially is a unified 
and and real solidarity of the workers necessary 
op kings in the steel, auto, rubber, 
4 
.d ,'- ', ': * .,,. The industrial form of the C.I.O. unions conducting 
the struggle in these 'industries lays a solid foundation 
for a unified command and the vital strike unity. Nev- 
erth'eless a danger 'threatens from the craft union lead- 
ers of the American Federation of Labor. These reac- 
tionaries, although they themselves for years have done . 
nothing to organize the mass production industries, are 
extremely antagonistic towards the Committee for In- 
dustrial Organization doing the job. They assume a 
dog-in-the-manger attitude. I t  is more than likely, 
therefore, that they will inject themselves into the situ- 
ation and try to inveigle a fringe of the skilled workers 
into their many disconnected craft unions. At the mo- 
, ment I write these lines they are following such a strike- 
breaking policy in the General Motors auto strike. 
Such an action would be a crime against *the steel, 
auto and other ,workers, as it would seriously split their' 
ranks and weaken'their fighting force. But no one fa- 
miliar with the shady history of the reactionary A. F. 
of L.leaders need be surprisd to see them adopt such 
a disruptive course. They have done it time and again 
in strikes of independent unions. The danger is all the 
ge%.te~-bam~~ht t e trust rnagrra%%+, 
the mrkers dissipate their gtrength fighthg 
always greet and encour;lge the craft unio 
their splitting tactics.. Nor. would such a d 
be unwelc~mp to the Roosevelt ~ , ~ i s ~ a t i o  
ing a prolific sowee of slippery campr~mises~ 
. Thq . i n~du&on  of craft @ 
ductioq ind*~&es by the A. F. 
resisted. nrjlitaantly by every p 
whale, l#wr, mvernen t as a stri 
. f . ,  
resiskncq ! &odd be supported by . an, %@+ye. sam- 
paignrto edktztte the unorganized massts as to the his- 
tor id  failure ofrLckft unionism h thk! mass produdion . 
industries, and by a call to these w o r k p  not to join the ' 
craft d o a s  but to affiliate themselves with the C.I.O. 
industrial aliaps, . I, f 
: If,' neeb.6- the craft unions should succeed in 
getting into.stael igr the time the strike t&es place, they 
must, be dealt {with on a united front basis, and 
unity of action mwht in this manner. They should 
be drawn into the strike on a full cooperative basis .with 
the industrial unions This. means that they ought to be 
allowed and induced.& w d  regular delegates to :the 
strike committees, and likewise to their sub-commi~tees 
- 
for relief, defense, publicity, etc., and that they should ' 
also participate in the inass picketing and sther mass 
st&& activities. The craft ieaders would object to this, 
'so it would have tobe done over their heads by' direct 
apped to the membership. Only in the unlikely event, 
however, that the aaft unions should become real fat- 
tors in the, steel industry would it be practical to make 
'Wan 
I A good ni&&&jk~te@t n&r forga his maih gb 
je&~e,. dtha&&.1&k9, ltsdm often do so. HC rehee~ 
to ' d o w  himself @ be diverted from his gad bp 'thk * 
feints afid tri&jbf- t&~opP~nents* And so ,it is with the 
labor ~ t e & i . " l i c ~ ~  tao, must always L a p  his ma$& 
objective in' -miad* H e  ,%w constantly be on the alert 
to keep the a p l v .  from sidctacing hiu kkok 
in~viihent kitti the #I& bwamp of delay3 &k$eption 
, 'and: bettayal. &p&MIfr is such l+ilantie mmxsary 
.dh& the enemy ;%.'thz powerful arrd rmmm s t k l  
I '. )mt* ' . , 
' 
Up rill' the prcstnt time the cehtr;sf wegy of the 
, steel corporation hadaimed at d-oying thg *el earn- 
p&gn rby.gi.3ng'higgardly wage i n a d t o  'the wokm 
'iind by. cultivating the comp&y uni9q :although their 
.&a; pl,ht supplies of tear gas, ma&@& &s a d  other 
dedly ~ e p o n s  $how that they p r c p h g  fa; &tic. 
'vklenae.: The employers have b a n  unable as yet under 
, a pr-t circumstaqms to-employ the widespread diii- 
18 
charge of wakkcrs, suppression of free spe'ecb tmrorisrn 
of 'workers and -organizers, etc., with whi&fQhe+y op- 
p o ~ d  the q@ihing campaign in 19 19. 
< 
2 Jr-J>*i 
As soon as the movement of the steel w 
proaches the, Esoinq ' of mass action we may. e 
the steel bztc~gv i l l  go into the next stage of t 
union stra&gyy,- not only by using more terro 
methods, buf;sJso by having recourse to ,the polic 
seel&g. toLdi~sr$ the whole thrust of the 
fro& tb;e:coiqia.nies and into a hopeless morass of gov- 
ern-tzl m&ttees, court action, time-killing media-. 
I 
tipn, ate, .,Th& first real test of the . steel workers' 
s2~efi*a&lMt~--g3~ will come when- they have 
organized th.g bdk of the workers and they serve their 
&madquppgvthe Iron and Steel Institute for a con- 
ference 'to wa& but a national trade union .agreement 
for the steel-indxistxy. I t  is at this point that the steel 
companies will attempt to paralyze or kill off the work- 
- ers' movementby: bgging  it down in-a swamp of dis- 
integrating .msnc$wm. 
This is whm- ,due ' workers must be most acutely on 
guard and when they have to persist most determine* 
towards their centrd objective of forcing c~ncessi~ns 
directly from the employers. The steel workers must 
not trust their.ause into the hands of the Roosevelt 
government. .The government is allied with many great 
capitalist inte~ats, and it cannot be depended'upon to 
force the steel trust .to make a settlement favorable to 
the workers. cEspecially ,must the steel workers beware 
that Roosevelt's ''era of good feeling" policy does not 
result in some sort of a compromise disastrous to their 
movement If Heirst -and other labor haters are en- 
- .. ; SW& eqerieqmi k p g  .serve Ilksons to; . the sfeel 
iw~skqrs in. their pc-t develoyjing -glee :T~(S:=& 
mt+ t~yikdd -to .I& - ~ a n d s ,  p f  workenn \-iThe s t d .  
#&m &mt: not Jbt . <their ~mmnt,dtgehaa& iato 
I a~~raritiatui~~lta ~&e end their .rig&-~h up 
-~k l&d  : !m*r&a-mn~r&$ ,&dolls :=p@Q& 
e d l @ * j b  wi&&w:or - n o o \ & * T & & !  h a s h .  t;gb.&rfll 
,:die tsgePE, ~~mkem;? .  ~ ~ ~ s e ~ ~ ~ O n s . ) j n ~ t ~  k 
p f e e ~  agaiiist.. thQ. hdY ift k& . 
" 4 .  *&e &iai;* I'!,!; , I ;  i!- 1 h .  ,,:j:,, I,. : * I  ; if!.tts,4r 
~:~d3q~cert l ta&i tk  .? L of tihe rmd-emtashbdd..bt. a. 
settlement between the unions and the employers, and 
every step taken. must be directed to acco~~@ish this 
end. The steel wmkm shbuld not enter into &bitration 
proceedings or other settlement maneuvers e n w e e d  
by the government ynless, first, their maj 
have been conceded, and the steel trust is most 
to make such preliminary concessions. These 
are especidly necessary inasmuch as the wo 
have many illusions regarding the libera]. pal 
+?<< Roosevelt &otrernment andsuch illusions can easily lead 
to defeat. 
A Rbadmum M o b i i o n  of Foxes 
Should the employers fail in their inevitable attempt 
to liquidate the steel workers' movement through gov- 
ernment or court action, or through some such phony 
arbitration as employers have so often defeated workers 
in the past, then in all likelihood they will set out tobeat 
the C.I.O. and the 'Amalgamated Association in an open 
strike struggle. Just what kind of a fight they are &tt 
ting ready to make may be gathered from the fact that 
they are now storing up their plants with machine guns, 
rifles, tear gas, etc, and are even drilling their thugs 
in preparation - for a fierce strike. The steel workers, 
a therefore, m-t base their plans upon the practically 
certain prospect'of a great strike against the steel cor- 
porations. 
The pe'rs-ive of a huge national strike confronts 
the workersp leaders with the necessity of k i n g  dose- 
ly in mind another basic principle of strategyJ that of 
mobilizing a full sufficiency of forces to achieve their 
objective. .A good strategist never sends a boy to do a 
aba bDss with f i d k y , , ~ ~  juat 
.l@B@H% @h&p1)1' haic#b d@' &r0I&ghin, 
. '  
;, , ' 7  Y 
.I - ;I&<$ %-&is h t  ,the 'work? ' 
. . at? lkwiemlrn 
t 
they .wibg 4 able to fight far. T+!@ to the ' 
w@ng'-of thc.m~pemmia of the st-1 WU&@.-&; the 
greatest mbilbtion sf hbor~s forces ever ma&il&<&e ,' - 
Unitedstat- ' .  . - . ' q&&,. i-,;\j 
ilp. & T&@ amd Place - > .  
Another major strategic ~ c ; o n ~ t b a  that must 
wsys .be boraa<h mind in strikes is Wt of 
htow at~&.bt-& and p h .  -The $&npp. 
bth .* &-giirapr moment *nd its mdgp :&-He spot. UIF,'aaP 
Tb- ,wmi&ers, if. 'they Beep thk -pint d-dy in ! 
+?*i,b, a splendid paition to wb.. . . .. : 
TbGlGLO; plans to'have the majofity'af .&a. steel 
workers organid by the middle of E , '1937, 
after which the de'mmds of the workers dl be sub- 
'dtttd to sthe American Iron and Steel Institute and a 
conference insisted upoh. This is a practicd d e c i d e  
and it.dimaxes thi steel movement at a most favorable 
mohcnt. URdoubdy by the date set the great ms- 
jority af the workem' orn readily be organized. Then, 
allowing a .fkw week for prelimkky negotiations, the 
steel situation should come to a head somewhere about 
the aidt of Mar&. 
This is just the time (March 31) when the national 
agreeme~t. of the 500h000 bituminous miners expires. 
From a stxategk Standpaint-obviously the CO- thing 
to do is to ink up the. struggh of the steel workers 
with that of the b i t ~ m i n o ~  coal miners, and possibly 
also of the anthracite miners, thus develaping a broad 
movement of about a million coal miners and 
steel workem This appears to be the aim of thci 
C.I.O. and, if so, it is 6owd strategy. The interesb of 
into one genera m ~ ~ e ,  
inst the dosdy dligd steel, an$ coal m r p a  
, . . 4 !-A : - ! "^ I , .r. < I!.,- . . ,  
oh t  strike of *thecone million steei .workers Ld 
hers w ~ d d ~ ~ n c r : t  a txmendous pow&: I t l  *odd 
other in8wtgh Ear and wide., It mddd mn~titutb; 
by fdr the ' g r e a e  dt~+&tz. in A&&can L3stm-y. - In. view 
r, of the favorabla~ibkiun' h- idmi with prodwtion , 
rapidly 'rising, &eimfsobkd d l m i n m  pnd Steei*wsrk-', . 
em would bz &2& t~ V ~ X O ~ ,  .f~r&g the ' 
open sh+ r:the first dxm+ ~ . t r a t  Chds work- 
ers, l i b  h*d being. ( But labor .sho&d %hake -assuri 
& .&u~.y..;~m" by -holcing.i611 mcwe horses to the 
d-wgon.ift nced be. T h e r e , h ~  be contemplated $he 
ena&n,!~dthe strilre -smglgik omonibt6e vast ,arthie 
of.:~brkiers in. the aut&~bik, ,rubber and heavy metal - 
arid ,&d. fabrEahk indwtridy - and dm further, . 
i5.&-, :!#.. : . . .  :' . .  , . . 
The C.I.O. is now conducting org;mii;ea,hn cam- 
fisigiis *in :'these :- prodacti~n , industries. In 'the 
po*~ sitaiiion, a0 : fa-ble ihr orpnization = 
xpsb, its ~aunpai@ a.i ~ilyiand~shanld be spxdcd up 
a- &at# the unioks bvolpe8 (which+ rs ,they are led by 
thk' C.I;Qi-wo&:not have .to depeadbpan the reaction- 
ary i d r " ~ ~  >af the A. F; of L.) can alsocprmnt their de-' 
m~nds to 'the3 emplaye~i by &the: end of? Ma&, if not 
sd6n&. The c~trana of they~kkerrsk thcrauto, rub- 
. &F, ~alazniaiw h d  ather ,hkgh+ vb1nmbIc - and dd&ly 
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interlinked -production indwtries s&nultar~eousl~ 
or at approximately the same time into thei~trbggle :'[
would enormously strengthen the whole rndqement. :. 
Such a movement in the key industries would c 0 e ~ i ~ t e  . 
a most effective coordination of the strategic prin*:
of opportune time, key place, sutticient power, etc. 
each of these great groups of workers has its own .dp 
maads, the -entit.e - movement should' be - coordinated+l 
n .I* 
around the centritl strategic task of winning the de- ";-, 
mands of the steel workers. This main objectivk.espe- 
cially must not be forgotten in whatever skttlements 
are arrived at in the various industries. 
I t  may turn out in reality that the steel wokkers, coal 
miners, automobile workers, etc., will nbt actually co- 
ordiriate their national movements-the auto workers 
especially are 'ma ing  ihead and developing a great fia- 
tional struggle of their own. Possibly, in view of labor's ' 
present &xtkAely favorable position, these great 
groups, acting separately, may achieve their major de- 
mands. It '  is also possible, ilthough most unlikely, that 
they Can secure thiir ' .demands without great strikes, 
Nevertheless,' t'he &regoing proposed l h e  of strategy, 
the linking together of thesi: big movements, with steel 
as the center, is basicalljr correct. I t  would be a tremen- 
dous manifestation of labor's power. I t  is the best course 
to be followed :under the present drcumstances, the 
policy that would insue the ,.workersJ victory most 
quickly and completelg! iii these i d t r i e s  and open the 
doors the widest for a' general advance by labor on all 
fronts. 7 , .  1 . 4 ,  . . 0 
Every conservatiiie and reactionary influence will be 
exerted to prevent the steel workers, miners and other a 
key w ~ f ~ ~ ~ ~ - # ~ * j e  jroind$ 4~4; I IwiK to, defeat I _  
them one section rt j~ gjne. Tt is, there- 
and, ~ & e r  workep 
ike dune, jointly with thet 
gq oehet industries; at .last ' 
they mw bp*e:,*bwa ~ ~ ~ r t  from the *~raad 
w0rk.r-  T$1gg' to AW materials 
xx$$t out, 0f;the:sd mius.' If tbe 
of ,the. .m&oPd b e ~ t k ~ h o o d s  do ' 
not agree to. ptohibit the haqlbg of ,pws in a d  a d  of 
sguck rai?ls the. mk-md-file n i l r d  warkw$ must . 
be a r g a ~ d  not. tp go, thraugh the picket h i s  into the 
millsills and d this in spite of  the ,mge wn&ns that a e  
ctwnp~es; are evk%$rndp,pr@g to &ern to lull 
their fighting, spit& ,.. Pailue of  supp~rt fioq the raiG 
rOPd m h - p s  . in - this e l e p e n t q .  respect --was a basic 
, for thq i~psof-the 1919 strike and it must lzot be- 
.' repeated. . , . 
&&zed ,labw must .be prepared3 if namsary to 
t&pioFt the .a,pp-@ing stel  , strike by strike &on 
fw and wi& in magp ather ipdwbtris. At all costs the 
$eel ~+~rkrs '  tsugg1e for orpnizafion must be ;Fan. 
 he fa& of the trade union movement is bound up qrit+ 
the stpel w ~ r b s ,  x&me mayemcnt must nee& be car- 
' 'A . A through to v&or)c. 
Political Action in the Strike 
A national strike of steel workers, and &pecially a 
great combined strike of workers in steel, cod Bnd other \ industries, wodd be  highly political in ch&r. It 
would become immediateiy the central political 'i*e-'bf- 
the country. NO one would have a keener appre&tio&%; . 
, 
of this fact than the employing interests of the co&try* - 
In such a situation, we might be sure that they w h ~ i d  k 
shout revolution in all keys, and try to utilize the gov- 
ernment td stampede-the workers back to work in a wel- 
- 
ter of violence and confusion. 
"The.workers must also be acutely aware of the polit- 
ical character of the developing mass struggle and, as 
good strategists, be prepared to use every political 
weapon at their disposal. In  the great general strike 
in England in 1926, one of the worst errors made by 
the conservative union leadership was to ignore the ob- 
viously basically political character of the ' movement 
and to try to keep the struggle restricted to the eco- 
nomic sphere. This was disastrous, as it prevented the 
workers from utilizing their many political means of 
struggle. Such a mistake must not be made in the great 
struggle that in all probability will develop before the 
organization of the steel workers is conceded by the 
steel trust* 
Let me repeat: political action does not consist in re- 
lying upon the Roosevelt government to win the 
workers' fight against the steel trust. On the contrary, 
the wotkem must mobilize all their political organiza- 
tions yd sympathizers to ,reinforce the great economic 
strike struggle of their unions by bringing mass pres- 
*&fi&&tj~Pd, %ate iihd nationd, to 
of tmops, injunctions, etc, again,st the 
'to fdrce a strike settliment fav~rable to , 
medisfely with the development of 
eat .strike movement ' as now appears certain, 
on~~artisan League, the various Famer-La- 
ty, groups,. the Socialist Party, the &&mist ' 
the progressive. blocs in the national government 
tate legislative bodies, and other political, fprces . 
athetic to l ab , ' sh~u ld  all connect up their forces * 
ic knt;ment and bring d e t e ~ ~ e d  PO- ' 
.<: l i t i d  p~&ure e g t .  ( . I the ,, steel , corporations . through 
:thel g o v a ~ e n  t* ,, j , : y . i ,  
i . The O & O ~  of, pF, ~ h d d  alsa be. ~ t d i ~ e d  PO- 
l i t i d y  . by labor's cornhg forward militantly ~ t h  its 
%hole legislitive p-y~gram & the pr~emation and de- - 
velopmknt of  civil rights, for the, 30-hour week, im- 
proved social security and unemployrnenf relief, the le- 
gal right .to organize, abolition of compaqy unions, pro- 
hibition of scab-herding and spy &stems, etc A victory 
steel shogd ]be a&omwied by.a. general advance of 
Iqbpr ligiqlation in, evuy field. ; / I I .  *4 .&kt strike . iq steel, coal and other induskies 
.~bu&d , L , . .  Qlso put immediately upon thk agenda of the day 
the question d the political mass strike, and thq workers 
must, . frqg, the outset, prepare go toe this powerful 
p ~ l i t w  . , .  . f~rck;, I It is , certajn ,that in . many , localities, 
~ ~ ~ 1 $ l y  the authorities' tried, to syppps the 
'right ~~'~idiit ';and.when {hey used ii&nce qgaipst the 
e,eis, $4. geqerd spike, move~erstS,wodd or codd 
redto: Also, on. a ,  riatiaid &&, should +e steel. trust, 
*ripported by 'orbniied capital, maki' a determined ef-- 
I' 
fort to defeat the std& by violent meGures, the ques 
tion of o nation& gqne~d strike would alqost.cer;tainly 
&come a living iisiie among the ranks of 'lgWG,'+d@rd- 
less of the efforts of the rekctionary trade ~ n i o n ; ~ f i i p l s .  
the employers and the government to prevent.% .,  TI$.;^ 
political mass strike could have as its objec t iv~thd-  
withdrawal oi  troops and the re-establishment of .t$vil 
rights in the strike areas, the removal of anti-~abq#- 
government officials, the advancement of important la;'-;, . 
bor kgislatio~ thrust up by the strike situation, against ..\ 
the, shipment of strike. breakers, against evictions of the . 
. stdkem, for placing of strikers on government unem- 
ployed relief, the release' of arrested strikers, and for 
the, favorable settlement of the strike. 
During the past several years the American working 
dass has gained much experience with the weapon of 
the mass political strike to'add to its previous experience 
with the historic Seattle and Winnipeg general strikes. 
It learned very much about this form of political strug- 
gle in the great Sad Francisco strike of 1934, as well as 
in such local generd.strike situations as those of Pekin, 
Terre Haute, Minneapolis, Milwaukee; etc. The many 
valuable Iessons from these struggles must be used if 
such strikes, occur -during the approaching labor up- 
heaval. Should the organized employers * seriously 
threateq to beat the strike of the steel workers and the 
other mass prQdudion workers, the mas& of American 
, workers generally must defend the right of the steel 
s1aves;:t.o otganize :by using, as the situation may de- 
mand, the l o d  . or national political. mass strike. . 






HE ,previous chapters I have d i a s e d  several' 
I: 
ajor principles of strike strategy and taaics nee- . 
essary to apply in the event of a great strike in 
allied industries. It now remains to consider a 
others ~ q u i m d  to insure the success of such'. 
a struggle. The* indude good strike preparations, ' 
thorough-going strike organization, democratic strike . 
leadership, mass participation in strike activities, care of ' ., 
the materia1 welfare of the strikers, mobilization of the . 
strike reserves, ere. I 
In  view of the existing very favbrable economic and 
political circumstances a national strike of steel workers, 
and especially a great strike of steel workers and coal 
miners combined (and also possibly other industries), 
would create a situation extremely difficult for the em- - 
ployers to handle, and would probably be of short dura- 
tion. N.evertheless it would be- dangerous simply to 
place rekmce in the prospect of a short, quickly vidor- 
ious strike. If the employers determine to fight against 
the unionization of the unorganized ~orkers.~rnilitantly 
and with a l l  their power, the consequence might well 
be a long and bitter struggle, even where such huge 
masses of workers are involved. 
. We must remember that the 19 19 steel strike of 
365,000 workers lasted three and a half months; also 
that the national railroad shopmen's strike in 1922 of 
- 400,000 workers continued for five months, and that 
the great c a d  ~str&&.tin 1927, involvilrg ~~me-,100,000~ . 
 worker^^ -mn@wr, m a r  than a year. In fa&&, i write 
this,we n@w3 the powerful strik&kf i ~ 3 ~ ~ 0  
maritime .Ieting over two months 'a.q6:ugh, it ' , 
has shiPP+~ ~6mp1etely paralyzed on the e 
I' 
cific ~da&-&& bdly lamed on the Atlantic a 
Coast. 'glass workerg also, have been on 
t i ~ n d .  weeks already. 
In my-e~tmt, whether the ernploy~m intend to r 
to the ka&d&& or not, the best way to .\?riw about a ., . 
@p zg&&mritMe settlement of the prjhnbde 1337 ,: 
suike; iRhi& the bosses are forcing on thk workers, . 
is t o  m&e: : h t  stpike the biggest, best organized -and 
must k#mi~.in American labor history. The principles 
of i&e ~~atgmaiz~6oon utlined in this chapter are d- 
. 
culated to hidp kchieve this end. They are based on 
sound -exp&-&ee :and can be applied not only to steel, 
but aIso to slttombbile and such other industries as may 
be invofvd in mass strike movements in this period . 
, . tt * 
SMlre Reparation 
, . f .  a. - 
~un&meath ,-$ 'the carrying out of a good strike 
strategy is a *wz,ugb preliminary organization for the 
stmgg1k This is ,equivalent to the recruiting and -in7 
ing of .an qrmy kpfore the battle. Such preparation is 
- - 
qeci;Jiy necessary. in an industry like steel, where the 
workm haw ba$l ,very little experience in organization 
and disciplined action, and where the power and- ruth- 
l e $ s n ~  of- the enemy they have to fight are enormous. 
Good . preparation . gives . the workers incomparably 
greater striking power. I t  is on the same principk that 
drilled troops .are far better fighters than raw remuits. 
n the first thing ro oe ooinsiderw 
)$the union itself. This requires thaip%b 
campaign be speeded up so that-practicallp 
dy of steel workers are members of the 
re the actual, strike begiais. Nor &odd the 
kers in the steel plants be left out of the:stecl 
in its drive to organidon. Under the  tim mu la: 
of the great strik&in the a~to,~glass and other in- 
r*' ' - S s t r i e s  . and Pbith itbe workers i resent readiness to .or- f l  gdnize this' speeding .can beaeasily accompl~~h.ed--by ' . 
. the application Q# .broader methods of organizing wbrk . 
.> -4
r 
widespread radio brOadasts, vast distribution of litera- ' 
1 - t h a t  is, the h*giof :&reat series of mass meetings, , $,: 
!I ture, etc. It shonid ~ i o t  be difiidt, with* the use of such 
ihtense organizing 'methods, to soon have the workers 
pouring into the h ion  in a great flood. The steel oun- 
paign should- girn at solidly organizing every worker in 
. i the steel towns, including restaurant workers,. building ti 
. q  
t r a d ~ ,  retail clerk$, etc., into their respective unions . , A C 
The extension of the unipn t o  include' all ~ossible -.! 
,i 
masses of the steel workers is the &in insurance against ,I 
the' develqrnent of the dangerous hck-to-work .move- . t 
'hen&% that are always organized by the :emplpyers in . 
.&e@ great stiike and which are now so menadng <in thc 
autoh~bi'le strike. It is, of course, ~itzdiy necessary to 
' organize. the most important key p k t s ,  but the work 1 
mu'st'.hot be confined to them. It mukt take in the-whole 4 
steel ihdustry. - . 
Can the sitdown, stay-in and wdk-out types of local. '. 
S&&es . , 'which are nbw .so rapid1 y organizing the wwkerb :: 
the1 'auto industry a also be used in the ,@reliminzi,fy - 
of '  luhionizing . steel ? This r-insy to ' ' . . 
7 !earned. h ' t b .  steel movement: grows; as the. worken 
f&l the ' 1 3 a ~ i d i :  kdg, strong, as t.heir r # & 1 ~  ., a'&J 
fet~ling 6f power nise9<md, ;as they k e  woriifs bi~~W&& , - 
workem8.ama&zxg.~@a lofig pears of injusti 
dine to try lqch strkks themsehrlp~~ at least in t 
indepe~dent~ g$ahts. Whethk or m t  they 
s u ~ e s ~ f d l ~ ; ~ ~  depend upon whthar $the 
t&e;qd~&tage, of such locd stfikes to f k g  
md &s%t$pous partial struggles. In any 
-wi@;, do, well to proceed cautiody : in 
gmkd carefully against untimely.. I d l  f$~k.Bs and t~ 
continue its present strategy of subor&* all local 
kctiviiies to the development of a great ldiGplin4 na- 
tional movement of  ateel workers. , .  
It may well be that the' meth~d of the stay-in strike 
will .:be applied to @ny steel plants in the. event og i a 
geieral etriJcti dm, Whether or not it m i l l  be used a 
depend upon sevead-factors: if the worlrers consider the 
, experience in the rautomobile industry, was successfd, if 
the- govqnment is  hostile and will permit. the use: bf 
gas ! a d  other violence against stay-%I strikers,. if a 
union -f&s strong: qough to control the p i w  ,without 
staying tb, *if the prospect is far a Jong or short- str:ikq 
e,&* : It (was ?thk steel workers,. in Homestead. in. 1&92, 
g~ve. &e &st and most heroic American <exaqpde 
of, .spikere occqjying struck plants and it m3y bet :fa15 
lowed in the approaching strike. . 8 . . a x ,  . . .  2 .  t i \  . 
I :%esid&s signing. up .the - workers . it i s .  dso . nemqwy3 
as SObiim ppu$abJe, to, set ~p the new l o d  uni6ag. of 
the Amdga-ted Ass~$t i~n~ to get, fwgi: 
*@ng;.:Tbesq locals ahou&$ be sot, men* %pn;ql. qppT 
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plastered over the entire steel industry, and also pop- 
ularized far and wide throughout the whole country.. 
With myriads of bulletins, leaflets, stickers, posters, &., 1; 
as well as' haad d o  ampaigs, newspaper advertiG-1 . - ( 
ments, etc.; the workers and the general public 
be taught th.c.-mmning of the struggle and be 
vised of its promess. -Great mass . I d ,  district 
tibnal rmkGd-61e conferences and meetings of steel ,,. 
w o r b  itnd as things approach a head, a great mass 
Gi 
strike vote, should be utilized to. educate and organize 
thesteel workers for the coming struggh. 
:The old adage "Well begun is half doney? applies to 
'itpike strategy as well as to other activities. The first 
blow is. often decisive. Usually trade union strikes are 
badly organized, which weakens them from beginning 
to end. But this one must be diflerent. I t  should be 
thoroughly prepared, organizationally and ideologic- 
ally. If  this is done, then when the steel workers almost 
certainly strike in 1937, their walkout will be so com- 
plete that "no one will be left in the mills even to blow 
the whistle". 
h - c  SKke Leadership 
One of the basic .means for building a strong strike 
and fdt ,the working out of good strat& is the- devel- 
opment of ah democratic strike leadership throhgh na- 
tional and local broad strike committees. Usdally A. I?. 
of L. strikes are managed by small and remote com- 
mittees of bmeaucratic officials. These people, whose 
conservative and slipped policies make it necessary 
for them to prevent iank-and-file "interference in the 
strike controlay, remain quite detached from the working- 
masses. They issue arbitrary. commands to the workers,' 
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iwmzlt+diy apply the po=rfui weapon of. the,br 
s&ikc cornmkke* > I  : 
,The denimtizatim:.af the strike leadership sh 
start at the -top, Ti& national leading committee 
whole strike 'should. consi~t not d y  . of the national '*- . 
union execdves but also of striker representaavm $, 
from the vdti~bs triking areas )(and industries, if &e 
than sted" is ' iavolved) . This -b rd .$  committee, wkk , +, propar departments for publicity, ~dEef and defense, -. ,,, 
&odd deal .with major questions of- pbiicy. It should 
meet fkquently and have a s d : e i b t i v e  \committee 
awry on the strike leadership 'between, &tings. 
' Zarge departmentalized strike c~rnmitttm,~ .based 
upsn the regular tinion officials plus a broad iepresehtr- 
tion of mill strikers, should also be organized in the 
rcspettive steel towns and districts,' a9 -local -circum- 
stances 'may . dictatew Each steel mill ,should . also, liave 
its own brbad strike ,committee. The mill strike com- 
mittees' should - conduct 'their ' iocal activities under the 
leadersiiip of the local' or districtstrike' committees; 
the size of the committees varying according the size 
of the mills, the -;of rep2"esentah rangkg from one. 
memkr for each 25 workers .to,.one tmember for each 
100-;wO&ersw Such miil gtrike committees should be 
, thoroughly representative of all departments, special 
m e  beiirgtaken also to see that Negroes and f ~ i g n -  
bo& .workers are fully r@resented. and elected to re- 
.spomle lbading posts. -  he :women?s trade union am- ' 
iliaries should #be represented] in. the strike cammittees. i 
The mill strike committees have a maze of functions. 
. Espdcidly complicated are their tasks in the case, of . 
stay-& strikes. They. have. tb:-be organized, through 
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-cornmi-; 60 attend to pi&et&g,, discipline, .food, 
ments, medical care, errtertainment, de- 
the local al@ikeminmittee and other 
etc. Consequently, the my1 committees, , 
y responsive ta, the needs and control of 
e strike committees, national, d i s t r i d  local and 
, should be f d y  authorized to conduct the strike - 
all its phases, .&e various regular trade, union organs, 
such as national ~ q d c i v e  bbards, district councils, lop1 
- ? unions, etc., ei only to transact routine business 
not i m m e d i ~ t e I y * . ~ e d e d  with the strike. The various 
strike c o m m i ~ ~ : , & o ~ l d  be 'elected on the eve of the' .,, . 
.- . 
strike. Before & -strike is ended the national strike - , 
committee shad4 iubmit the proposed terms of settle- . 
ment for a refmdum.vote by the strikers. 
Thege principle8 'pf democratization atid departmen- - 
talization should'dsb be introduced into the A. A. struc- 
ture as the unit~q 3 built. The A. A. constitution k. 
owete, unfitted f o ~  the steel industry and &6uld be 
completely -written. , 
- a MauS(rite AChv2imi -. 
The working >out of a good striki. stratejgy requires 
the highest degree of mass participa.tioii by the strikers 
in the organized activities of the Strike. More than that, 
it also involves drawing .@e strikers' families .into 
these activities, for the- strikers' women and children 
are. also very effective fighters and morale builders. 
Qdy by such a general participation of the whole strike- 
bound population and the development cf .the highest 
~degeit: of ardvity possible by men, women and childretl, 
c q ~  the maximum striking power of the workers be 
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realized. In this respect again, the coming steel strike 
must be vastly superior to the czrdinary A. F. of L.. 
strike, in which, because the conservative leaders fear 
the growth of militancy among the rank and file, only 
a small percentage of the workers,. not to speak of 
their f ad i e s ,  actually carry on the strike, the great 
mass remaining passive. 
In previous~~ges I have discussed various forms of 
cultivating a high degree of mass strike activity-the 
holding of democratically . elected local, district and 
national rank-and-file pre-strike conferences to f ormu- 
late-and popularize the workers' demands and to elect 
the union officials, the taking of a national mass strike 
vote, democratic participation in the broad strike com- 
mittees, general voting-upon all settlement proposals, 
etc. To  these measures should be added the holding of 
frequent mass \ meetings during the strike; mass pa- 
rades of strikers; mass marches of men, women and 
children from district to district and mill to mill; the 
sending of small delegations, or flying squads of work- 
ers, from one area or industry to another; the teaching. 
of the strikers to sing labor songs in their meetings and 
demonstrations ; the development of sports activities 
for the youth ; the holding of social affairs, etc. 
But the most important of all forms of mass strike 
activities is mass picketing. Good picketing is a decisive 
factor in every big strike-that is why employers are 
so rabidly opposed to it. Picketing is usually grossly 
neglected in the ordinary A. F. of L. strike, only a few 
of the workers carrying it on, and then merely in a 
desultory fashion. The consequence is a great loss in 
the holding power of the strike. The best way to con- 
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duct picketing is on a mass basis. Not only should all 
the str&ms be mobilized for picketing, but their women 
and children as well. In addition, prominent liberals and 
others should be brought into the strike areas from the 
outside to march in the picket lines. Where one or more 
industries are strikhg, joint picketing should be organ- 
ized. The unemployed can play a most important role 
in picketing, and the members of non-striking unions 
#should also be systematically drawn into the work. 
Women's and children% picket lines should be organ- 
ized on special o-ions. This system of broad mass 
picketing raises en~rmously the political level, . enthu- 
siasm and r e s i s w  power of the strikers. I t  has been 
used effectively i n 7 m y  I.W. W. and T.U.U.L. strikes, 
by the more pr~gressive A. F. of L. unions, and by 
many unions in foreign countries. When the 1 93 7 steel 
strik&&mes, the progressive C.I.O. should adopt the' 
modern, effective .system of mass picketing. 
The picket line should be well organized, not mere 
crowds of workere. It should be 'imder .the control of 
the picket committeej which is a section of the strike 
committee. The .picketers should be organiisd into 
squads, each squad heided -by a carefully s e b d  cap- 
tain. All strikers shbuld he required to do their bit at 
picketing. The youth espe~ially should play a big role. 
in the L~rganization of the picket lines. The picket com- 
mittee must, maintan pickets around the mills at all 
times, whether or : not they are ' trying to operate with 
scabs. Especially must there be great mass picket lines 
on Monday mornings and upon all occasions when at- 
tempts are k ing  'made to bring stabs into ' the mills. 
Often. the .difference .between -bad picketing and good . 
I 
3'8; 
picketing fssjthe difference between a lost and a won 
strike. 
. Strike Publidty 
The question of a well-organized strike publicity is 
most fundamental to the success of a great strike in 
steel, or a combined strike of steel, coal, auto, etc. In 
such a big strike the capitalists will frantically howl 
thatr the whole movement is an insurrection, a revolu- 
tion, and they will throw their entire publicity machine, 
the newspapers, radio, etc., into the task of terrorizing 
the public and of driving the workers back to the mills 
in a welter of violence and confusion. In the 1919 steel 
strike they used such a ~ e d  scare effectively,' with the 
help of the Wilson government.' In. the San Francisco 
general strike in 1934 they also loudly shrieked rwo- 
lution and created ' a hysteria among sections of the 
population, and they do the same thing to a greater or 
lesser extept in every strike. We may be absolutely 
certain, therefore, that their poison-gas campaign would 
be infinitely worse in the case of the prospective nation- 
wide steel or steel-coal strike involving up to a millhh 
or more workers. 
To combat successfully this vidqus strikebreaking 
propaganda offensive of the employers will be basic for 
the-winning of &e strike. In 'order to create a favorable 
public'ophion it is necessary that the workers develop 
a great pu6lidty counter-offensive of. their own. They 
mtst ' dissipate the charges of revolution by centering 
the whole agitation around the immediate economic 
and political demands of the struggle. Th,ey should re- 
lentlessly expose the vast riches and profits of the em- 
ployers and the health-destroying; spirit-killing poverty 
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of the workers, the terrorization and suppression of 
civil rights by the bosses7 gunmen, the great signifivce 
to American democracy of a vic toiby the workers, etc. 
The strikers must know how to dramatize their struggle 
by sending women's and children's &legations to the 
state legislatures and to Congress, by securing investiga- 
tions by government and citizens' committees, by cover- 
ing the country with a network of sympathetic mass 
meetings, by staging great mass demonstrations of all 
kinds throughout the strike areas, by monster mass 
picket lines, etc. 
Not the least of this essential publicity work is the 
education of the strikers themselves, who will be sub- 
jected to the fiercest propaganda barrage from the em- 
ployers in attempts to stampede them back to work. The 
striking workers should be systematically taught the 
meaning and implications of the strike through a plenti- 
ful flow of regular bulletins, special leaflets,,mass meet- 
ings, radio broadcasts, etc. Especially must they be kept 
informed in detail as to the progress of the strike itself. 
In this connection, in case of a hard strike, among other 
such measures to be adopted, rank-and-file delegations 
should be sent from district to district so that workers - 
may be directly informed as to the status of the strike 
from personal observation. In 19 19, ,in the later stages 
of the struggle one of the most effective strikebreaking 
methods of the bosses was to have fake delegations of 
warkers visit various strike districts and then start false 
reports and demoralization among the strikers, both in 
their home towns and other centers. Neglect of the fun- 
damental task of 'systematic education could easily result 
disastrously in a bitterly fought steel strike. 
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T o  meet these huge.educationa1 tasks of creating at 
favorable public opinion and of keeping'confusion out 
of the ranks of the strikers, ther national strike com- 
mittee should set up a special publicity section, with 
an experienced publicity director in charge. This pub- 
licity' department, in addition to buildhg its own im- 
mediate publicity machinery, should systematically 
mobilize the trade union, revolutionary and liberal 
press, as well as friendly radio broadcasters and news- 
papermen working on the capitalist press. All these ele- 
ments cooperating together would constitute a great 
educational force, one that could make the voice of the 
strike heard loudly and clearly in every corner of the 
. country. 
Strike Relief 
Strikes, like armies, march on their stomachs, and 
many are the strikes that have been lost through hunger. 
In making ready for a great strike in steel it is necessary 
that all preparations be made to build up a strong sys- 
tem of strike relief, despite the probability of the strug- 
gle being of short duration. In  the matter of relief 
work, as in so many other of their phases, usually Amer- 
ican strikes are very weak. Strikes which provide relief 
systems that can serve as types for the coming strike 
were the 19 19 steel strike and the 1926 Passaic textile 
strike." 
The strike relief machinery should be in operation 
not later than two weeks after the strike begins, because 
* See The Great Steel Strike d i t s  Lessom, by William 
2. Foster, and The Pavsaic T e d  Strike, by Mary Heaton 
Vorse. 
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, from the outset there are always emergency h e s  re- 
quiring attention. The C.I.O. general call for a strike 
fund ought to go out immediately upon the declaration 
of the strike. This to be supported by calls from the 
A. F. of L., individual trade unions, state federations, 
central labor cofincils and othet sympathizing organi- 
tions. Of  course, the reactionary A. F. of L. leaders will 
kither openly or covertly oppose such strike support, ; 
\ 
but their opposition must and &n be broken down by 
rank-and-file pressme. . 
The striking union or unions'should set up an organd 
i d  relief department i s  a sub-section of the general 
strike committee, withr ari experienced relief organizer 
in charge. Strike relief work has two general aspects- 
collection and distributi&-nd there must be created 
sp&l organization for each. On the collectian side, the 
organization shauld consist of: (a) trade union strike. 
relief committees in various cities and towns; (b) united 
front relief committees or other workers' organizations - 
in the same localities; (c) special relief committees of 
liberal professionds, clericals, pacifists, writers, etc. All 
these committees are to be coordinated through the na- 
tional relief department of the strike .committee. A 
corps of relief collectors and organizers should be put 
in the field by the national relief organiation. Depots 
should be established in all important centets for the 
collection of cash, food and other strike supplies. Na- 
tional and local relief conferences ought. to be held 
wherever praqtical. There can be drawn into the relief 
collection work not only tpde pnions, but also churches, 
Y.M.C.A.'s, Negro organizations, - fraternal societies, 
farmers' unions, veterans' organizations, cooperatives, 
42 
unemployed workers' organizations and workers' po- 
litical parties. . 
The, distribution side of the relief is to be handled 
by special relief committees of strikers in the strike 
areas, under supervision of their respective strike com- 
mittees. The relief committees require sub-committees 
to investigate needy cases and to check up generally on 
the distribution of relief. In this sphere, the strikersJ 
womenfolk can do very important work. 
At the outset of the strike all efforts should be made 
to get the strikers on the home relief lists upon the 
same basis as the unemployed. This can be accomplished 
in many places with the proper political mass pressure. 
Inasmuch as regular strike benefits could not, in all 
probability, be paid in a national 1937 strike of steel 
workers, the strike relief necessarily takes thi-ee major 
forms: (a) distribution of cash for the strikersJ special 
expenses; (b) amnion8 kitchens where food is pre- 
. 
pared for the strikers and their families, with special 
food for the smaller children (4) commissaries from 
which families may carry home groceries, clothing and 
other strike relief sumlies. 
Money. The organLtions farming the C.I.O. should 
place upon themselves heavy strike  assessment^. Other 
unions should adopt voluntary assessments. This fin- 
ancial. income should be supplemented by tag days, shop 
.collections, social affairs, special milk funds, etc., or- 
ganized by the strike committees in the various centers. 
Food. Great concentration must be made upon the 
coli&tion of non-perishable foods by the strike corn- 
rnittees, house-to-house, collections being organized. 
Special attention should be given to collecting &trike 
43 
relief supplies in the immediate .strike areas and sur- 
rounding territories. The farmers provide a rich source 
for food collection in such big strikes and their organ- 
izations need to be contacted. 
Shelter. This is always a great problem in large , 
strikes. It must be attacked in a variety of ways: by 
doubling up the evicted families with others, by mora- 
toriums in rent paying in strike-bound towns, by ex- 
tension of credit to strikers by landlords, by court action 
and mass pressure to prevent evictions, etc. Where 
company towns exist, tent colonies and barracks may be 
necessary to take care of the wholesale evictions. The . 
shutting off of gas, electricity and water can often be 
stopped by exerting political pressure upon the local 
authorities. In some instances cash is necessary to meet 
rent, water, light and similar expenses. 
Clothkg. Systematic collections of all kinds of cloth- 
ing should be made by the relief committees all over 
the country. Local clothing repair units can be estab- 
lished in the strike towns by sympathetic women and 
tailors. Cobblers should be organized to take care of 
shoe repairs, etc. 
Medical Aid. In every strike center medical units of 
voluntary doctors, dentists, nurses, etc., should be estab- 
lished. Medical units also may be organized outside 
and sent into the strike areas by the relief committees. 
' 
In addition, there should be committees of outside doc- 
tors to visit and to give publicity on conditions in the 
strike districts. 
Relief collection and distribution must be handled 
basically as a political question, not as a matter of char- 
ity. In t the strike districts, strike relief should be so 
organized as to stimulate mass picketing, each picketer 
being furnished with a card which is puhched to indi- 
cate the amount of picketing he has done. The collection 
of relief in the various cities should be utilized to arouse 
the dass-conscious solidarity of the workers and to 
draw the broadest masses of workers into active support 
of the strike. The whole relief apparatus, collection and 
distribution, must be utilized to popularize the objec- 
tives of the strike, to prevent the recruitment of strike- 
breakers, to defend the strikers' civil rights, and to 
' bring pressure to bear upon the employers and the gov- 
ernment for a favorable settlement of the strike. A 
well-organized relief system can exert a tremendous 
force in strengthening the strike, both economically and 
politidly. 
Strike Defense 
In every strike the question of defending the civil 
rights and personal safety of the strikers and the union 
leaders constitutes an important problem. Especially is 
this problem acute in a great strike against the lawless 
and violent steel barons. Defense activities are not only 
a matter of court action, but especially of mass pressure 
of the strikers and the widest possible masses of strike 
sympathizers against the government and the employ- 
ers. The national strike committee requires a legal de- 
partment which organizes this branch of strike work. 
Here the International Labor Defense can also play an 
important part. A staff of voluntary attorneys should be 
recruited nationally and in the respective strike areas. 
Attacks on the civil rights of the strikers by the em- 
ployers, in whatever manner, must be militantly re- 
sisted. All the forces of the strikers, the outside labor 1 
movement, the strike relief organization and the: sym- 4 
pathetic masses generally should be mobilized to protest 
against such attacks on the democratic rightse of the i 
workers, through the holding of  mass meetings, sending' ,; 
of delegations to the state legislatures and Congress. '4 
When injunctions am issued forbidding the right -of 
free speech and assembly the strikers should follow the 1 
traditional American trade union policy of ignoring such . 1 court orders. When troops are brought into a strike area 4 the strikers must not only firmly insist upon the main- % 
j 
tenance of their civil rights, but also know how to fra- I 
I ternize with the saldiers and thus win s many as 
possible of them to the side of the strike. ! Vigilant protection must' be constantly given to the ,, 
persons of the strikers and their leaders; when either $ 
striker or leader is arrested for strike activities, he a 
'should be promptly ddfended legally and polidcally. 
A 
Where there is . danger of violent attacks upon the 
strikers' meetings or upon their leaders by gunmen and 
vigilantes, these meetings and leaders must be person- 1 
ally defended; such protective heasure~ being organ- 
ized by the picket committee m& being especially the . I  
task of the youth. Against the' coihpany-controlled vio- 
lators of civil rights and for the personal safety of 
strikers and leaders the strikers should make active ve ' 
of all available political institutions, including the arrest 
and prosecution of the armed thugs; the securing of in- 
junctions against the violators of the workers' civil 
rights; the remov4 impeachment and election defeat of 
lawless city and state officials. 
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M o b i i g  tho Strike Reserves 
Every good general understands that a basic p'art of 
his strategy is carefully to mobilize and utilize his re- 
serves, and the need to do this is no less acute in a 
strike, especially in the case of a great strike in steel and 
allied industries. Such a strike would for the outset 
have vast potential reserves, created by the profound 
sympathy the strike would awaken in the toiling masses. 
These masses would realize that not only were the 
strikers',interests involved in the struggle, but also their 
own living standards and democratic rights. The strike 
leadership must know how to organize ind make the 
maximum use of this favorable mass sentiment of these 
great reserves. Usually, this kind of work, like the 
various other tasks that go to make up 3 strong strike, 
are grossly neglected in A. F. of L. strikes. Such must 
not happen in the steel strike, for we may be sure that 
the steel trust will mobilize every reactionary influence 
in the United States behind its cause and the workers 
will need every possible ounce of support for theirs. 
The question of mobilizing the reserves of a national 
steel strike involves not only developing the solidarity 
of the workers' main forces directly-the support of 
the unorganized masses of workers, of the members of 
company unions, of the unemployed, of the non-striking 
trade unions, of workers' cooperatives and of the wdrk- 
ers' political parties-but also the mobilization of the 
huge masses bf semi-proletarian and petty bourgeois 
sympathizers who are actively interested in the winning 
of the strike. This necessitates the development of 
united front committees of youth dubs, fraternal socie- 
ties, ch-xches, peace movements, professional guilds, 
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women's Negro orpimtiofis, farmers' cooper- 
ative~, veterans7 asso&tions, etc, for various strike 
tasks. . - 
In A the preceding pages 1 *have sketched concretely 
soole ,bf the ways in which these very vital petty by- 
p i s  and semi-prbletarian strike reserves. & be util- 
ized, including their. prtieipation in .p*ubiiCity work, 
kchn id  aid for s.trikem3 -defense and relief activities 
and general politid : wqrk. To facilitate the ,mobiliza 
tion of these rest$we% a national citizens7 committee, 
comprising such -1ibed strike sympathizers-including 
* politicia~~s, e d ~ t p r s ~  -scientists, writers, artists, etc*- 
a should be set at-the commencement of the strike. 
This liberal. committee must work closely with the nh- 
ciond strike committee in political activities in support 
of the strike, aqd ,&odd stimulate the, formation of 
local relief c o m m i ~ ~  of liberal strike sympathizers. 
Especially in the str* .areas is it necessary to build up 
skdlar strike citizens? committees of professionals, small 
businessmen, clergymen, white coUar workers, office- 
horns and representatives of varioibs mass bganiza- 
tions, t6 offset the strikebreaking activities of the ever- 
present and dangerous citizens7 committees organized by 
the employers. A national strike in steel and allied in- 
dGtries must be made a great rallying issue for fihe 
major mas& of the democratic forces, of the United 




I T IS a fundamental principle of strategy, whether military or .labor, to follow up the victory by pushing back the enemy on every front and to cap- 
ture all possible of his strongholds, In the months ahead 
the C.J.O. leaders, as well as the progressive forces 
generally of the labor movement, must give this stra- 
tegic principle serious consideration. 
Lenin once wisely remarked that we never can have 
real victory unless we also know how to retreat when 
need be. A good 'general always bears this thought in 
mind. In this situation, however, there need be no per- 
spective of retreat. The strategy must be based on the 
offensive, and animated by a spirit of daring and in- 
domitability. The stage is all set for a great labor vic- 
tory, provided only that the trade union leadership rises 
to the occasion, to the height of its tasks. This victory, 
which can be so readily won, must be realized to the 
full in all  its possibilities and implications. In the first 
chapter of this pamphlet I indicated the great impor- 
tance to the working class of a victory in the steel in- 
dustry. Now let us look at this whole matter a little 
more concretely. 
Orgadzing the Millions of Unorganized 
When, early in 1 93 6, the workers of France, fighting 
against the rising menace of fascism and organized in 
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a great united front of Radicals, Socialists and Cornmu- 
&ts, defeated the reactionary forces and elected the 
present Popular Front government,' one of the after- 
maths of their victory-wis that within a year the French 
trade union movement increased its membership from 
some 1,500,000 to over S,000,000. This is about 
I 
equival&t to the American trade union movement (con- 
sidering the differences in size .and industrialization of 
France and the United States), leaping up from ,'its 
present low figure of about 3,500,000 to a membership 
of 15,000,000 or 20,OOO,OOO. A victory in steel in the . 
United States, if properly followed up, would un- 
doubtedly give. a tremendous stimulation to trade union 
organization in general in this country. I t  is a question 
whether there will be as great an advance as that which 
followed the victory of the Popular .Front government ' ?< 
in France. But certainly success in the steel industry * g  
would throw the door wide open for the organization 
of many millions of workers. The extent to which the 
possibilities of the situation will be realized will de- 
pend largely upon the ability and farsightedness shown 
by the trade union leadership. 
Even in the very favorable situation after a great 
victory in steel, the organization of these millions of 
workers can only happen in the fullest measure if the 
progressive forces everywhere in the trade union move- 
ment make the task of organizing the unorganized all 
labor's first order of business. Determined drives must 
be made to begin the unionization of the huge masses 
of unorganized in all fields, the millions of general 
metal and electrical workers; the mass of textile work- 
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ers, the army of truck, bus and taxi drivers; the great 
numbers of unorganized packing house, metal mining, 
building trades, food workers, lumber workers,. agri- 
cultural workers, etc, as well as those in the auto, rub- 
ber, aluminum, oil, glass and other industries now being 
organized by the C.I.O. Nor shauld there be forgotten 
the masses o f  white collar workers, teachers, technicians, 
oftice workers 'and government, employes, who are in- 
creasingIx re& for organization. 
Big inroads by the trade unions into these great un- 
organi~ed millions can be made by the labor movement 
if the work is gQne about with system and decision. 
Every , branch of organized labor must take up the 
organization work. The C.I.O. should seize upon the 
event of a victory in steel to redouble its own efforts 
to organize the mass production industries aad to stim- 
' 
date  ail sections of the labor movement into the greatest. 
organizing campaign in the history of American labor. 
The re~tionary A. F. of L. Executive Council~must be 
compelled by mass pressure to support the growing 
organizing campaigns, or at least hot to sabotage them. 
Every international union, state federation of labor, 
city central body and, local union should begin organ- 
izing work in its respective sphere. The whole l&r 
movement must surge with organization work. This is 
the first task in consolidating a steel victory, by register- 
ing it in the fundamental field of organization among 
the unorganized millions. If this task of organization is 
well conceived and properly carried out, it will mean 
incomparably more power and militancy for the labor 
I movement in this country. 
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Reozgullb the Trade U*M 
The organization of steel and other mass production, - 
industries, with its establishment of the principle of in- 
dustrial unionism and its smashing victory over cam- 
pany unionism, its bringing of millions of unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers into the unions and its giving rise 
to a militant and union progressive leadership in these 
industries, would necess&ilihave profound effects upon 
the whole trade union movement in many directions. 
It would lay the basis for a far-reaching revamping of 
organized labor's policies, structure, leadership and gen- 
eral outlook. I t  would provide the workers with a splen- 
did opportunity to free themselves finally from the 
mess of reaction and crookedness that has marked A. F. 
of L. officialdom for many years past. To consolidate the 
victory in steel especially requires that it register itself 
in full force in this sphere by a profound reorganiza- 
tion of the trade union movement as o whole. 
The further substantial advance of the trade union 
movement in this country necessitates breaking the con- 
trol of the Greens, Wolls, Hutchesons, Ryans, Freys 
and- the other top misleaders of labor, together with that 
of their local understrapper gangsters, racketeers and 
small-time reactionary bureaucrats. These people have 
stood in the way of the workers' progress all too long, 
drawing their enormous salaries and shamelessly play- 
ing the game of the bosses. More and more the workers 
are evidencing a disposition to get rid of them, as is 
shown in such recent elections as those among the New 
York painters, teamsters and longshoremen and in many 
other places. And with a real victory in steel, this ten- 
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dency would be enormously strengthened. The workers, 
. if given proper leadership, will be ready to make a 
grand sweep of the whole reactionary crew that now 
dominates so many trade unions. 
The trade unions must also break finally with their 
reactionary top A. F. of L. officials' traditional policy 
of dass collaboration, and begin to orientate towards 
policy of dass struggle. Fifty years of bitter experience 
teaches that class collaboration, based upon the false 
principle of the harmony of the interests of capital and 
labor, has nothing but defeat to offer the workers. The 
workers can gain nothing by their officials wheedling 
the bosses and adapting the unions to the latter's needs. 
 h he^ can only go forward by a policy of struggle. The 
workers can win only what they have the power and 
determination to fight for. It is high time that the trade 
union officialdom -ms jarred loose from the bosses' 
apron-strings. For the first time in its history the Amer- 
ican trade union movement will stand on its own legs, 
both in the economic and the political struggle. 
A further vital part of the necessary reorganization 
of .the labor movement is that the trade unions must be 
thoroughly democratized. T h e  workers should put a 
final end to present baneful conditions of nation4 
unions that never meet in convention; local unions that 
go on for years without holding meetings, stolen trade 
union elections; officials self-elected for life ; expulsion 
of workers because of their political opinions; unions 
controlled by notorious racketeers; trade union agree- 
ments adopted without rank-and-file sanctiop; corrupt 
leaders furnishing union-card strikebreakers to employ- 
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ers; open dkfiance of majority d e  by miion officials; 
union conventions comprised almast entirely of paid . 
ofticialg, etc., etc. The present' forward surge of the 
workers, especially in the event of a victory in steel, is 
just the time to deal a mortal blow to this whole poison- . 
system of autocracy andl corruption-that has cursed 
. the American labor movement for so many years. 
The badly needed reorganization of the trade union 
movement should also =esult in placing not only the 
unions in the mass production industries upon an in- 
dustrid union hasis, but the craft unions generally .as 
well. Steps ought to be taken in every industry where 
the craft unions are established to gradually consolidate 
them into industrial unions through a process of doser 
cooperation, federation and amalgamation. Practical first 
steps towards this industrial goal are: one general na- 
tional agreement for all railroad trades and a strength- 
ening of the railroad federation movement by including 
all of the twenty-one railroad unions; uniform agree- 
ments in the building trades to expire on the same date; 
amalgamation of the metal tradtx into one industrial 
union; formation of a national maritime 'federation. on 
' the Pacific Coast model; orpGizaton of *a general trans- 
port workers' federation; creation of a federation of the 
' needle trade unions closer affiliation of the printing 
. trades; federation of the food trades unions, etc. A vie- 
tory in steel and in other mass production industries 
would greatly facilitate this advance of the craft unions 
generally towards industrial unionism. Craft unionism, 
a product of the horse-and-buggy age, was obsolete 30 
years ago and it is a heavy drag on the progress of the 
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working class. It must be superseded by a modern, 
effective system of industrial unionism in all industries. 
Reunite the Americas Federation of Labor 
The present split in the A. F. of L. is a menace to 
the interests of every worker in this country. I t  leads 
to a weakening of the organizing campaign in the mass 
production industries; it causes craft union strikebreak- 
ing during strikes of the industrial unions (auto, radio, 
etc. ) ; it divides labor's forces politically, and it weakens 
the working ddss on every front. 
The split is the rotten fruit of the reactionary Green 
bureaucracy which, fearing that the organization of 
the millions of unorganized, semi-skilled and unskilled 
will jeopardize its rich sinecures, have gone even to the 
extent of splitting the labor movement in order to pre- 
vent the organization of the unorganized and to main- 
tain its own worse than useless leadership. I t  traitorously 
and illegally . suspended C.I.O. unions with over 
1,25 0,00 0 members, simply because the latter seriously 
undertook the organization work in the mass production 
industries that the A. F. of L. Executive Council has 
stubbornly refused to do. No one but the employers 
and a handful of reactionary trade union leaders profit 
from such a shameful spectacle. The breach in the 
ranks of labor must be healed. The present situation, 
and especially if the steel workers are victorious, offers 
a splendid opportunity for the progressive forces of 
labor to mend the split in the A. F. of L. on a sound, 
progressive basis. 
I t  is necessary first of all to prevent the present split 
from spreading. The workers must. refuse to unseat 
C.1.0. union delegates in the state federations and 
central labor unions if ordered to do so by the A. F. of 
L. Executive Council. They must hold intact the labor 
movement at the bottom, even if it is split at the top. 
There must also be no splitting of international unions; 
wherever the question of afliation to the C.I.O. or A. 
F. of L. develops, the principle of majority rule must 
prevail in all such cases. I t  is important also that the 
C.I.O. retain its present status as a national committee to 
carry on organization work in the basic industries, as 
this will prevent the reactionaries from spreading the 
split into all  sections of the labor movement, as they 
would do if two rival national labor federations faced 
each other. Meanwhile, while putting these emergency 
measures into effect, a unity campaign must be carried 
on far and wide throughout the whole trade union 
movement, to win as many as possible of the trade 
- unions to condemn the splitting policy of the A. F. of .  
L. Executive Council and to give active support to the 
organization work of the C.I.O. Especially must the 
local A. F.' of L. craft unions stand solid with the 
C.I.O. industrial unions and vice versa in the case of 
strikes, rind under no circumstances permit their mem- 
bers to work when strikes are in progress. 
The C.I.O. is based upbn the most fundamental sec- 
tions of the proletariat, those in the heavy, mass pro- 
duction industries. I t  is doing incomparably more vital 
I 
and important work than the reactionary * E x d i v e  
Council of the A. F. of L. The latter is a brake on the 
labor movement, while the C.I.O. is carrying on the 
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most fundamental work of organization and stimulating 
labor's progress generally. The C.I.O. already dearly 
has the backing of an overwhelming majority of the 
organized trade unionists, as well as of great masses of 
the unorganized workers. And as its work of organiza- 
tion proceeds the mass support of the 'C.I.O. will in- 
crease by leaps and bounds i n  all sections of the work- 
ing class. 
It is most vitally important that the C.I.O. organize 
this vast supporting sentiment in the craft unions, so that 
these progressive forces, united on a sound program of 
industrial unionism and the organization of the unor- 
ganized, can break once and for all  the deadly grip of 
a the Executive Council reactionaries on the labor move- 
ment and throw their full strength into organization 
work. In the present circumstances the victory over these 
reactionaries will not be too difficult, if the C.I.O. will 
give more attention to this matter and take more active 
steps to organize the progressive forces throughout the 
labor movement. 
Under the consequent heavy pressure, the machine of 
the Greens, Wolls and other reactionaries in the craft 
uniolis would soon collapse and the progressives secure 
the 1eadership.of the labor movement. And in the pro- 
cess the unity of labor could be re-established, despite 
the reactionary opposition. The present great surge for- 
! ward of the masses, especially in the event of a victory 
in steel, must result in uniting the forces of labor-! 
F. of L. craft unions, C.I.O. industrial unions, railroaa 
brotherhoods and millions of unorganized workers- 
; . into a great united, progressive A. F of L. based upon 
industrial unionism. . 
A victory in steel, with its redtant  lpas enthusiasm 
and increased fighting spirit, must especially be utilized 
to strengthen the w o r k  politically. It is disistrous 
folly for the workers to support a d  depend upon the 
. 
old political parties. This is true also of the present 
administration. The Rooscvelt gover-ent is a capi- 
talist government and will of its own volition do noth- 
- 
ing to infringe upon the real interests of the great fin- 
sncial rulers of the camtry ,  nor has it done so in the 
past. All the real concessions that the workers will get 
from the present government is what they have the 
organized powv and good sense to fight for. The work- 
Us and other toilers.must have their own political party 
and program and ghre them strong mass support. 
. The next months should see great political activity on 
the part of the workers, farmus, and lower middle 
dass elements. In conferences and meetings they should 
map out united front programs of state and national 
legLlative demands and then give theq the ~ol id  backT 
ing of all their trade unions, farmers' organizations, 
.progressive blocs in Congress and state legislatures, and 
of the workers' and farmers' politid parties. Mean- 
while, they should also systematidly set up local and 
state Farmer-Labor Parties, wherever there is a sutli- 
uent mass basis. This whole developing political move- 
ment should go in the direction of the formation, as 
soon as possible, of a great m t i ~ d  Farmer-Labor Par- 
ty, the beginning of a broad People's Front in the 
United States, to wage struggle against the growing 
menace of hunger, fascism and war. 
Clearly, the C.I.O. has a heavy responsibility to fur- 
ther this progressive political work. The reactionary 
A. F. of L. leaders have refused to develop independent 
political aftion by the workers and they know no other 
politid policy than to keep the masses enchained to the 
' Republican and Democratic Parties. I t  is highly dan- 
gerous further to neglect building a great Farmer- 
Labor Party of the toiling masses. These masses are 
more and more showing signs of breaking with the two 
old parties, and if orffanized labor does not give them 
the lead with a new party, they are exposed to the 
serious danger of falling u&r the control of such 
demagogues and fascists as Hearst, Coughlin, Smith, 
Lemlre, Townsend, etc: The organization o f  the work- 
ers in the mass production industries, and particularly 
if there is s victory in steel, will lay su6ticiently broad 
foundations for a great Farmer-Labor Party in the 
United States and otherwise facilitate its development. 
History thrusts upon the C.I.O. the responsibility of 
bringing such a party into actual being. 
Ihe .Struggle for World Peace 
With the great strengthening of the trade union 
movement in numbers, program, leadership and class 
consaousness that will come from the organization of 
the workers in steel and other basic industries the trade 
union movement of this country must take a more pos- 
itive part in the struggle to maintain world peace and 
democracy. The world is -facing the war threats and 
tyranny of the fascist aggressors, the Hiders, Musso- 
linis, Fra~lcos, etc., and more and more the democratic 
forces of the world, with the Soviet Union at their head, 
are organizing to prevent these fascist barbarians from 
)deluging the world with a new and more'terrible blood- 
bath. The American workers must do their share, side 
by side with the democratic masses of other countries, 
to hold back this threatening slaughter and to defend 
the very exiitence of civilization itself. 
The A. F. of L. policy of non-participation in world 
affairs is fatdy wrong. Despite the sophistries of Presi- , 
dent Roosewlt, Wiiam Green, Norman Thomas, and 
a host of others, there can be no neutrality for the 
. 'United States in the war that the fascists are now so 
busily preparing. The whole world will be drawn into 
the slaughter if and when it comes. The only way Amer- 
ica can keep out of war is by keeping war out of the 
world. At all costs, the American workers must help 
stop the approaching war by supporting the policy of 
collective security against the fascist aggressors. We 
must give active aid to the brave Spanish workers and 
peasants who are now struggling heroically against, the 
fascist butchers; we must support militantly the peace 
program of the Soviet Union; we must re-affiliate the 
American trade unions to the Amsterdam Trade Union 
International we must connect up ow own forces with 
the anti-fascist fighters for peace in every country. And 
all these measures must.& backed up by a powerful 
united front peace movement in this coirtltry, consisting 
of trade mions, farmersJ organizations, professionals' 
associations, youth organizations, peace societies, wom- 
en's dubs, religious bodies, local Farmer-Labor ~aities ,  
Socialist Party, Communist Party, etc As a mass pro- 
gressive f ~ r c e  the C.I.O. has the responsible task to 
draw the great body of trade unionist; into this vita1 
struggle for peace. 
3Role of the C.I.O. 
The C.I.O., led so aggressively by John L. Lewis, 
is doing a historically important thing in carrying on its 
vigorous campaiign to organize the armies of exploited 
workers in the mass production industries. As we have 
seen, this campaign has within it possibilities for a fun- 
damental strengthening and reorganization .of the whole 
American labor movement. Thus the C.I.O. has be- 
come the actual leader of the trade union movement. 
The Executive Council of the A. F. of L. has shown 
itself opposed to this vital organization work and be- 
cause of its narrow craft union and p e m d  interests 
has refused for many years past to do the organizing 
I : that the C.I.O. is now undertaking. Had it so desired, 
the A. F. of L. could have easily organized the steel 
worksrs during the war, or during the Coolidge period 
of prosperity, or during the strike upheavals under the 
N.R.A. in 1933-1 934. But the A. F. of L. wanted 
nothing to do with the organization of the steel workers. 
And worse yet, now that the C.I.O. unions, which are 
awake to the basic importance of this task to themselves 
and to all other workers, are proceeding to accomplish 
the organizing work that the Executive Council has so 
long neglected or prevented, the Executive Council 
actually suspends them, one-third of the whole Iabr 
movement, from the A. F. of L., and thus traitorously 
splits labor's forces in the face of the enemy. Never, 
even in the shady history of the A. F. of L., has rnis- 
leadership sunk to lower levels. The A. F. of L. Exec- 
utive council has surrendered the true leadership of the 
trade unions into the hands of the C.I.O. 
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The Communist Party heartily supports the C.I.O. 
organizing campaigns in the steel, automobile, rubber, 
glass, textile, oil, etc., industries, and it mobilizes all its 
forces to assist in this work. I t  extends this aid for the 
same reason that it supp,orts every forward movement 
of the workers-wherever it may originate or what form. 
it may take, whether it be a strike, an organization cam- 
paign, the carrying on of independent working dass po- 
litical activity, or what not. The Communist Party has 
no interests apart from those of the working dass, and 
every victory of the workers is a victory for the Com- 
munist Party. But in supporting the C.1 .O.'s organizing 
work the Communist Party does not fail to point out 
constructively and in a friendly spirit whatever it may 
consider to be- weaknesses in that work, such as the inT 
s a a e n t  mobilization of the progressives in the craft 
unions to support the C.1.0.'~ position, hesitancy in 
using more aggressive methods of mass organization 
. work, underestimation of trade union democracy, failure 
to raise the question of industrial unionism regarding 
the craft unions themselves and insdicient orientation 
towards the formation of a national Farmer-Labor 
Party. Also the Communist Party, with its revolution- 
ary program, looks far beyond the perspective of the 
C.I.O. I t  aims at the abolition of the capitalist system 
and the complete liquidation of the exploitation of man 
by man through the private ownership of industry and 
the land, by the establishment of socialism. 
The C.I.O. has done very good work up to dace, but 
its biggest tasks still remain ahead. There is to be . 
accomplished not only the successful completion of the 
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' *  organization drives in steel, auto, etc., but also, as I 
have pointed out, the broad tasks of consolidating the 
' 
victory; th;Lt is, of realizing the fuu economic and ' 
: political possibilities of the C.I.O. movement, including , 
the extension of the organization work far and wide in - 
: industry generally; the re-establishment of a unified 
and democratized A. F. of L. based on industrial , 
unionism and a dass struggle policy and with a progres- 1 
sive leadership; the, foundation of a great united ,, 
front Farmer-Labor Party as the beginning of an ' 
American People's Front; the building up of a broad 
peace m.ovement, etc. These tasks confronting the + 
: C.I.O. amount, in sum, to a veritable renaissance of the 
whole American trade union movement. 
John L. Lewis and other C.I.O. leaders, although ' 
having a very conservative background, have shown a 
a real spirit of progress in the development of the C.I.O. 
movement. Their progressive advan& was a most ex- 
traordinary development to take place in the ranks of 
the reactionary A. F. of L. trade union leadership. And 
to accomplish the historic tasks of the great forward 
development of whifh they stand at the head, new tests 
will be made of their responsiveness to the masses' 
needs. To realize in full the implications and possibilities . 
of the situation they will have to display the broadest 
vision and livest progressivism. They have in, their 
hands the opportunity to do a most fundamental service 
to theworking class, not only of America, but of the . 
whole world. 
New Ymk, Jamary, 1937 
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